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TRIAL OF LEGAL ISSUES IN INJUNCTION AGAINST 
TORT 
Edgar N. Durfee 
[This essay appeared in a casebook on Equitable Remedies that was 
used for years in mimeographed form at the University of Michigan Law 
School. It was never prepared for final publication by Professor D~rfee 
himself, but the numerous changes made in his own personal copy indicate 
that he had given much thought to the subject. Professor John P. Dawson 
who had collaborated with Professor Durfee has incorporated these changes 
in the present text. More changes might have been made by Professor 
Durfee if he had planned to publish it. The editors believe that as it stands 
it deserves a wider audience.] 
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF INJUNCTION AGAINST TORT AND CRIME 
A. Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centuries 
IN LOOKING back to this early period, we must keep in view the fact that our ancestors did not distinguish sharply between crime 
and tort. For example, the Appeal of Felony (not an appellate but 
an original proceeding) has, .to modern eyes, a mongrel look. It was 
entitled in the name of the injured party, not of the king, the 
management of the case was in his hands, and it might result in 
redress to the injured party (e.g., return of the stolen goods) but 
it might also result in hanging the defendant. For another exam-
ple, the action of Trespass had distinct criminal aspects in its earli-
est stages, and they persisted to our own day in the allegations of 
force and arms, and in the requirement of disturbance of posses-
sion of property or direct violence to person. Of course this is but 
one aspect of the historical picture in which we see early lawyers 
viewing each form of action as distinct from every other form of 
action and content that each should conform to its own rules. It 
was a distinctly modern note when lawyers began to emphasize a 
classification of actions under the heads of crime, tort, contract, 
etc. When this note had been sounded, the forms of action were 
doomed to an eventual demise. 
In the earliest days of the chancellor's activity, he too admin-
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istered both tort law and criminal law, in the sense that he did 
what, from a modern point of view, amounted to this. Maitland 
painted the picture accurately, without intrusion of modem ideas, 
when he said of this early period: "The complaints that came be-
fore them [the chancellors] are in general complaints of indubi-
table legal wrongs, assaults, batteries, imprisonments, disseisins and 
so forth."1 
In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries several important 
things came to pass, with more or less causal interrelation. (1) 
Strenuous opposition to the broad powers indicated by Maitland 
led to increased emphasis on what, supposedly, had always been 
the limits of his jurisdiction, viz., to administer extraordinary jus-
tice in cases where the common law gave unsatisfactory results. 
(2) The royal Council, mother of courts, gave birth to the Chan-
cery's twin sister, the Star Chamber. The procedure of this sister 
court was very like that of the Chancery (both were modelled on 
the canon law) and the chancellor himself was its president. As 
Star Chamber specialized in crime, this type of business naturally 
tended to disappear from the Chancery docket. We need not ask 
whether the "adequacy" formula should or should not have taken 
account of remedies in the Star Chamber. The chancellor's re-
linquishment of this embarrassing jurisdiction is sufficiently ex-
plained by the fact that in Star Chamber he shared responsibility 
with a score of great lords and judges, while in Chancery he sat 
alone. (3) Modem groupings of crime,.tort and contract were gain-
ing recognition, though the lines of demarcation had not attained 
the sharpness (that is to say, the relative sharpness) which they 
have today. 
The seventeenth century saw changes of the first magnitude. 
Star Chamber, which had become odious to left-wing Englishmen, 
was abolished on the eve of the Great Rebellion. There, one might 
think, was Chancery's opportunity to resume its crime-tort juris-
diction, but it was barely able to ride out the storm that sank the 
sister ship, and this was no time to take on more and peculiarly 
perilous cargo. Furthermore, the statute that abolished Star Cham-
ber fairly indicated transfer of its jurisdiction to the common law 
courts. These unfavorable conditions obtained throughout the 
period of the Commonwealth. The restoration of the Stuarts was 
1 MAITLAND, EQUITY 6 (1910). 
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incidentally a restoration of the chancellor to a firm seat on the 
Woolsack, but it was now too late for him to claim as heir of Star 
Chamber, for the judges had already enjoyed twenty years' undis-
turbed possession. 
B. The Eighteenth Century 
This period saw the revival of the jurisdiction to enjoin tort. 
Fortunately there were some scattered but remembered examples 
of tort jurisdiction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on 
which bold chancellors could build, and the generalization that 
inadequacies of the common law actions were to be remedied in 
chancery was an ever present help. Then, as now, there was the 
choice between a "hands and knees" technique of sticking closely 
to precedents (the technique that is sometimes described as the 
search for "white horse" cases) and the "flying-trapeze" technique 
in which we build on specific cases a much wider generalization. 
So a prior case of injunction against waste could be made an au-
thority for injunction against nuisance by way of a generalization 
about in junction against tort or a still broader generalization that 
Chancery gave relief when legal remedies were inadequate. 
But when we look more closely at the record, we see that the 
development was not symmetrical; the Chancery interfered much 
more freely in some parts of the tort field than in others. The most 
rapid advance was made in injunctions against waste. By 1800 one 
could have said, without undue liberty, what a Nebraska judge 
did say a century later, that "injunction will be granted in all cases 
where an action would lie ... to recover damages. "2 There is only 
one inaccuracy in this statement. In the classical definitions of 
waste any alteration of the premises was sufficient, but the chan-
cellors refused to enjoin trifling or ameliorating waste. The point 
was never of first importance for suit in equity would seldom be 
brought for trifling or ameliorating waste, and by redefinitions of 
waste through invoking standards of reasonableness, "meliorating 
waste" became a rare bird. 
The eighteenth century also saw a marked development of in-
junction against nuisance, but the development was not as rapid 
2 Hayman v. Rownd, 82 Neb. 598 at 601, 118 N.W. 328 (1908). 
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as in the case of waste. Notably, nuisance cases ran into difficul-
ties with the doctrine that the chancellor could not try questions 
concerning the rights of the parties, a point we shall have to ex-
amine at length but may lay on the table for the moment. 
Turning to injunction against trespass, we find a strikingly dif-
ferent picture. Bills were filed in the eighteenth century with in-
creasing frequency, but almost invariably failed. Again difficulty 
was felt with respect to trying questions of right, but that was not 
all. The reports reflect the notion that trespass was, in the nature 
of things, foreign to the jurisdiction of the chancellor. For exam-
ple, in Mogg v. Mogg,8 where injunction against cutting of timber 
was denied, Lord Thurlow, distinguishing a cited case of waste, 
said, "In the present case the defendant had no interest; he was a 
mere trespasser, and being such, an action of trespass would lie 
against him." No other reason for the decision was suggested. His 
lordship did not venture to say that the action of trespass is a more 
adequate remedy for the cutting of timber by a trespasser than is 
the action of trespass on the case for cutting of timber by a tenant. 
It is also to be observed that what little progress was made in tres-
pass cases was made by blurring the lines of distinction between 
trespass, waste, and nuisance, as when Lord Hardwicke spoke of a 
trespass "continued so long as to become a nuisance,''4 and Lord 
Eldon explained a case as "very near waste" where defendant had 
in fact committed waste by opening a mine in land of which he 
was tenant and had committed trespass by extending the boundary 
of his estate.5 In both instances one sees evidence of an unanalyzed 
notion that waste and nuisance are proper business for the chan-
cellor but that trespass is not. 
In this connection (there will be no better) it may be noted 
that the word "trespass" has been loosely used in equity to em-
brace some cases that would not have supported the action of tres-
pass in the strict system of common law procedure. What is really 
meant by the term is a case distinguished from nuisance in that 
defendant, in person or by his servants, has entered upon plain-
tiff's land (that is to say, land alleged to be plaintiff's), and dis-
tinguished from waste in that defendant has no estate that entitles 
3 Dick. 670, 21 Eng. Rep. 432 (1786). 
4 Coulson v. White, 3 Atk. 21, 26 Eng. Rep. 816 (1743). 
5 Smith v. Colyer, 8 Ves. Jr. 89, 32 Eng. Rep. 286 (1803). 
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him to the possession of the land (that is, is alleged to have no such 
estate). 
Injunction against trespass lagged behind in the eighteenth 
century and still shows the effects of early inanition. But why was 
its infancy so blighted? Perhaps the mere fact that it stood in closer 
relation to Star Chamber history had something to do with it. Tres-
pass cases are more likely than waste or nuisance cases to involve 
crime, and it may have been felt that the presence of an element of 
crime was prohibitory, though we have finally escaped this diffi-
culty by sharp discrimination between tort and crime-the fact that 
defendant's conduct is criminal is, we say, immaterial, neither fur-
nishing ground for equitable relief nor ground for its denial, so 
that the case is left to hang entirely on the tort aspect of defend-
ant's conduct. But this approach, which is natural enough for a 
lawyer who habitually thinks in terms of a broad distinction be-
tween crime and tort, was not so easy for an eighteenth century 
lawyer. 
Progress may have been impeded also by the fact that the mine 
run of trespass cases necessarily involved difficulties with respect 
to the adequacy of other remedies. Viewed in detail, the trespass 
cases present the factor of adequacy in all degrees, from highest to 
lowest, and it is impossible to say where in this scale the typical 
case falls. On the other hand, in the typical case of waste or nui-
sance, other remedies are quite inadequate and one can almost say 
that they are always inadequate. This, it will be observed, suggests 
an analysis that brings all three types of case to the same doctrinal 
level, viz., injunction is granted against threatened tort when other 
remedies are inadequate. But eighteenth century lawyers were not 
as accustomed as we to broad generalization in terms of "tort." 
They still tended to use narrower categories such as waste, nui-
sance, trespass and so on. So it happened that in the eighteenth 
century, when the injunctive remedy was being wrought from 
meager precedents and under the cloud of Star Chamber history, 
the complete adequacy of legal remedies in a considerable fraction 
of the trespass cases and the near-adequacy of such remedies in a 
still larger fraction of those cases might be felt, without being con-
sciously analyzed, and so might constitute an undefined drag on 
the development of the injunction. 
Note that all that was said in the preceding paragraph lies in 
the realm of speculation. It represents an attempt to identify fac-
tors in the history of injunction that were not formulated in con-
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temporary legal literature; factors of such a nature that contem-
porary lavvyers could not see them any more than they could see 
the circumambient air. Now let us consider what these lawyers 
did see and what they did say. 
We need not dwell upon occasional arguments based on the 
cost and inefficiency of trial by deposition, or the inconvenience 
of bringing local causes to London. These were but solemn efforts 
to justify things as they were, rationalization in the worst sense, 
since they set up one bad rule to justify another. But there was 
another reason given and on this we must dwell at some length-
the objection raised to trial in equity of disputed questions of le-
gal right. This objection is one that the chancellors of the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries struggled with constantly. It is not 
wholly disposed of today. The confusion found in the cases, both 
early and late, may well have been due to the fact that the problem 
was never clearly identified. Let's start then by defining the 
problem. 
The proposition that emerged in eighteenth century decisions 
went beyond an assertion that the chancellor could not entertain 
a suit the sole purpose of which was to determine title.6 It was 
much more drastic than that; even when legal remedies were in-
adequate and injunction was proper in every other respect, if the 
dispute on the merits was a dispute as to title to land, this ousted 
the chancellor's jurisdiction. But in specific performance of con-
tract, where tradition was continuous from the fifteenth century 
on, it was never held that the legal rights of the parties must be de-
termined by an action at law.7 Indeed, the idea was ludicrous. In 
the name of trust or mortgage or fraud, the chancellor could take 
the legal title from one who, under the rules of the common law, 
6 For example, in a suit to remove cloud on title. Welby v. Duke of Rutland, 2 Bro. 
P.C. 39, 1 Eng. Rep. 778 (1773), concluded that a bill for this purpose was unnecessary 
and the legal remedy adequate, even though the plaintiff was in possession so that he 
could not bring ejectment and the defendant had not entered so that trespass would not 
lie. Jurisdiction to remove cloud from title came later. 
7 Story in his chapter on Specific Performance said: " .•• before Lord Somers's time 
the practice used to be ... to send the party to law; and if he recovered anything by 
way of damages, the court entertained the suit; otherwise the bill was dismissed." EQ. 
JUR. §738 (1836). But his authorities are talk merely and most of the talk was addressed 
to cases of other types. I find no decisions whatever to support this statement. What 
it all comes to is simply another manifestation of the urge to make the law symmetrical, 
consistent with itself, by extending the rule concerning trial of the right. In the realm 
of injunction against tort, this urge produced decisions; in the field of specific perform-
ance of contract it merely produced talk. 
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was absolute owner. In the name of equitable waste he could en-
join the exercise of the privileges which the common law attached 
to a legal estate. These few examples of the chancellor's unques-
tioned power to abrogate common law rules are quite enough to 
show the absurdity of denying him power to apply common law 
rules. American statutes commonly deny to the justice of the peace 
power to try title to land, even when it is incident to the ten-dollar 
suit which is within his competence. This too must be connected 
with the idea we are about to consider, for property in stocks and 
bonds, rather than property in land, is now the significant factor 
in our social (and shall we say our political?) order. It is only in 
musty legal lore that land tenure is still a subject of paramount 
concern. Perhaps the survival of these musty ideas will explain the 
limited powers of the modern American justice of the peace, the 
humblest officer in the judicial hierarchy. But the chancellor was 
not the humblest; he was the most exalted of all judicial officers. 
The question then is: how did this absurd idea arise? The ini-
tial confusion and the changes that occurred from generation to 
generation were chiefly due to conflict, three cornered conflict, be-
tween tradition, logic and justice. 
II. TRIAL OF DISPUTED RIGHT 
A. Tradition: The Historical Source of the Rule 
In feudal England, not only was land the principal form of 
wealth, but land holding was at the heart of the social and political 
structure of the realm. Tenure meant personal status and quasi-
sovereign power as well as enjoyment of the possession and fruits 
of the land. These conditions were reflected in scrupulous atten-
tion to the remedies concerning land. Of the long list of actions 
represented in the register of writs, the larger part involved land 
law. This meant royal concern about these matters and particu-
larly meant concern about getting them into the royal courts. The 
Council also ventured into the field of tenure but it did not get 
very far. Hostility to this use of prerogative jurisdiction was par-
ticularly bitter, and it soon had its way. The Council was barred 
from issues of freehold tenure.8 The chancellor, who was so closely 
81 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 485ff (1922). 
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related to the Council, can hardly have escaped the implications 
of its defeat. The record does not show equivalent parliamentary 
action against him, but this could not be expected-the bounds of 
his jurisdiction were set by a quite different process, the day to 
day pressures of common law courts and lawyers that brought 
forth the tacit compromise in which the chancellor limited his 
jurisdiction by self-denying ordinance and was allowed to exer-
cise jurisdiction so limited. Once the restrictive notion had become 
familiar, its survival is not hard to explain, for we know the power 
of legal rules to persist when there is nothing but professional tra-
dition to keep them alive. 
How does this tradition regarding trial of title fit in with our 
picture of the growth of injunction against waste, nuisance and 
trespass? We are concerned with cases only where there was a con-
troversy concerning the underlying rights of the parties, as distin-
guished from (a) cases where there was only a dispute as to the rem-
edy-e.g., as to the amount of damages or as to plaintiff's right to 
an injunction and (b) cases where there was no dispute at all. In 
the waste case the bill attributes to the defendant an estate which 
entitles him to possession, and defendant will rarely claim any 
other estate. In fact, in the typical case, there can be no r~om for 
dispute on this point unless someone has blundered in drawing 
will, settlement or lease. In the nuisance case, the defendant's title 
to the land he occupies will be quite immaterial. It may be essen-
tial to the establishment of the tort that plaintiff have some estate 
in land, since the tort is commonly thought of as an injury to others 
as land owners (not in a personal capacity), but it will be a rare case 
where the defendant will question plaintiff's claims of ownership. 
When we turn to trespass cases, we find the situation quite differ-
ent. Plaintiff claims some kind of interest in the land and asserts 
that defendant has no interest therein, that he is a mere intruder. 
This, defendant will rarely admit. Even though he denies the alle-
gations of the bill with respect to the acts he has done or threat-
ened on that land he will usually deny the allegations of title. It 
seems clear that the rule against trial of title necessarily operates 
selectively, obstructing injunction in the trespass cases but not in 
the others. We have already seen that there were other reasons for 
the lag of injunction against trespass, but that is not inconsistent 
with the conclusions we have now reached. Indeed the several 
negative factors would reinforce each other. 
The effect of these several restrictive factors was two-fold. (1) 
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The chancellor hesitated to grant in junction at all in trespass cases. 
Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this use of 
the injunction was extended, but slowly and timidly. Even in the 
present century misgivings have been expressed about injunctions 
against trespass. (2) In the cases in which in junction was granted, 
the remedy was made to wait upon the adjudication of title in a 
law action. This necessarily meant two actions where one should 
have sufficed, and necessarily meant delay in the granting of the 
remedy-sometimes a serious matter, sometimes indeed so serious 
that the injunctions ultimately given had too much the character 
of locking the door after the theft. 
B. Logic: The Rule Expands by Analogy 
The rule against trial of title looks silly when viewed apart 
from its historical antecedents, and so, as feudal origins fell farther 
and farther into the abysm of time, lawyers must have felt that 
there was no reason at all for distinction between this particular 
kind of issue and other issues touching the legal rights of the par-
ties. From such thinking one might expect abandonment of the 
rule. But the rule was writ large in the books and law is law. So 
lawyers were driven in the opposite direction. They generalized 
from the proposition concerning trial of title and came off with 
the sweeping proposition that the chancellor could not try dis-
putes concerning the legal rights of the parties. Again we are in-
dulging in historical speculation, for all that clearly appears in 
the record is the fact that late in the seventeenth century there was 
objection to trying the title to patent and copyright9 and in the 
eighteenth century the idea was extended to the issue of nuisance, 
vel non.10 It would be unprofitable to attempt a complete and de-
tailed statement of the extent to which this process of logical ex-
9 Anonymous, Vern. 120, 23 Eng. Rep. 357 (1682); East India Company v. Sandys, 
1 Vern. 127, 23 Eng. Rep. 362 (1682). 
10 Fishmongers' Company v. East India Company, Dick. 163, 21 Eng. Rep. 232 (1752); 
Weller v. Smeaton, 1 Bro. C.C. 572, 28 Eng. Rep. 1304 (1784). The earlier cases show no 
recognition of this notion. See Osburne v. Barter, Choyce Cases 176, 21 Eng. Rep. 102 
(1583), where the bill was dismissed because plaintiff had sued at law, and Bush v. 
Western, Pree. in Ch. 530, 24 Eng. Rep. 237 (1720), where injunction was granted without 
trial at law. In the latter case, plaintiff's title seems to have been clear and the objection 
frivolous, but the report does not indicate that this was regarded as an essential circum-
stance. Sixty years later, Lord Thurlow did not treat Bush v. Western as a sound decision 
on a clear title, but disposed of it as an anomaly. Weller v. Smeaton, supra. 
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tension was carried. We must, however, note that it was never car-
ried to its logically ultimate conclusion. Not only in specific per-
formance of contract but in in junctions against waste, 11 the tradi-
tion was established early enough to hold its ground. Other cases 
there were where logic faltered.12 
When one takes a broad view of the whole field of equity, it 
becomes fairly clear that what happened in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was this: old notions about trial of title to 
land were stretched into broader notions about trial of legal issues 
in those critical cases where other difficulties were encountered. 
There, restrictive factors nourished each other. If the chancellor 
was embarrassed by lack of specific precedent, or was in doubt on 
the point of adequacy of legal remedies, dismissal of the bill could 
so easily be put on a supposed necessity of first establishing the 
legal right in a court of law. Per contra, where the case presented 
no other difficulties, the point about trial of the right was cheer-
fully ignored. This interpretation of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century cases is borne out by the fact that the infection never 
spread to certain types of cases which first rose in the nineteenth 
century, when we were doing our best to live dmvn the old notions 
about trial of legal right; for example, the injunction against un-
fair competition and the labor injunction.13 
11 The sole exception seems to be Lathropp v. Marsh, 5 Ves. Jr. 259, 31 Eng. Rep. 
576 (1800), where injunction was refused because no action -had been brought. Eden said 
the decision was "clearly wrong." EDEN, INJUNCTIONS, 1st Am. ed., 141, note b. 
12 The two cases of contract and waste are mentioned because they are fairly anal-
ogous to the cases where the extension of doctrine did occur. Somewhat more remote is 
the case of foreclosure of mortgage where plaintiff was never required to establish at 
law the execution of the mortgage or the existence and amount of the debt. There 
were, of course, some types of suit to which even a strained logic could not lead, because 
the principles on which the chancellor acted were foreign to the common law: for 
example, the suit to enforce a trust, or the suit to redeem a mortgage. 
13 The time factor is conspicuous in the case of the bill to remove cloud from title. 
Here the sole issue, on the merits, is title to land, that most sacred of all legal issues, 
yet it seems never to have been held that there must be a prior action at law or even 
that issues must be directed to a jury. In several cases such requirement has been ex-
pressly rejected. Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533 (1892); Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 11 Mich. 
252 (1863); Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S.E. 730 (1906). Is there any explana-
tion except that this remedy developed in the 19th century, when the old tradition was 
expiring, and that this remedy bore little resemblance, on the surface, to the injunction 
cases where that tradition was still observed? The older bill to quiet title against one 
who threatened repeated actions at law was, of course, quite different. In that case, there 
must have been at least one prior suit at law, ,because it would be absurd to find an 
intention to bring repeated actions when defendant had not sued at all. 
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C. Justice: Th'e Rule Is Eroded by Modern Demands for 
Procedural Efficiency 
549 
No great perspicacity is needed to see the untoward results of 
the doctrine under discussion, whether in the narrower form that 
went only to trial of land title, or in the extended form that moved 
toward inclusion of all legal issues. Whenever the rule is applied 
it produces as its minimum consequence double litigation, one ac-
tion at law and one in equity, and usually it produces serious de-
lay. But we must avoid exaggeration. The rule never interposed an 
absolute barrier to equitable relief, for it was always understood 
that when plaintiff had successfully prosecuted an action at law 
and defendant continued his tortious conduct, injunction was 
proper. This practice made the rule tolerable, but it also exposed 
its absurdity. Would a decision of a court of law yesterday, founded 
on the facts existing when the action was commenced last year, 
really establish the rights of the parties for the purpose of a bill 
filed today and seeking an injunction looking to the future? In at 
least three nuisance cases defendant contended he was no longer 
doing what was held to be nuisance in the prior action and thus 
that another trial at law was necessary to determine whether he was 
still guilty of nuisance.14 Obviously the same contention could be 
made with equal force after a second trial at law and so on ad 
infinitum. Therefore the contention was rejected. But it still must 
have been seen that the contention was logically sound, given the 
absurd premise that the court of equity could not determine legal 
rights. 
It remains to examine several relaxations of the rule. The old-
est of these employed what might be called the "ancillary tem-
porary injunction." When an action at law had been brought, 
plaintiff could, upon a proper showing,15 obtain an injunction 
until the action reached judgment, and injunction could even be 
granted pending the determination of an action thereafter to be 
14 Soltau v. DeHeld, 2 Sim. (n.s.) 133, 61 Eng. Rep. 291 (1851); Imperial Gaslight Co. 
v. Broadbent, 7 H.L.C. 600, 11 Eng. Rep. 239 (1859); Carlisle v. Cooper, 21 N.J. Eq. 576 
(1870). 
15 This involved some sort of showing with respect to the rights of the parties, pre-
sumably by pleadings and affidavits alone. From the early cases, one derives the impres-
sion (definite knowledge is impossible) that a stronger showing was required than would 
ordinarily be required today upon a motion for a temporary injunction. See United 
States v. Parrott, 1 McAll. 271, 27 Fed. Cas. 416, No. 15, 998 (1858). 
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brought. In the latter case, the court might frame issues to be 
tried at law, to make sure that the question of legal right and that 
only was litigated. In either case the injunction was conditioned 
upon diligent prosecution of the action and upon the results 
thereof. Usually the Chancery plaintiff was also the law plaintiff 
and the injunction was to be dissolved if he failed to prosecute the 
action diligently or the judgment went against him, and was to be 
made permanent if the judgment went in his favor. Sometimes the 
equity defendant was required to sue at law and in this case the 
in junction was to be made permanent if he failed to prosecute 
diligently. We are unable to say when this practice arose, but it 
was known before the close of the eighteenth century and was 
firmly established early in the nineteenth century.16 It eliminated 
the delay of the equitable remedy in those cases where the tempo-
rary injunction was granted, but this does not mean every case in 
which injunction was an appropriate remedy, because then, as now, 
there was a requirement of special equities for the interlocutory in-
junctio~. In no case did this practice eliminate the burden of 
double litigation. 
The problem that remained was to eliminate or at least to miti-
gate the operation of the rule at final hearing, so that the whole 
controversy could be disposed of in the equity suit. Pursuing a fa-
miliar process, the profession went about this by a whittling proc-
ess, chipping off a piece of the old rule here and another piece 
there. Let's patiently count the chips. 
(1) Early in the nineteenth century a distinction was drawn 
between disputes on questions of fact and those on questions of 
16In Weller v. Smeaton, 1 Bro. C.C. 572, 28 Eng. Rep. 1304 (1784), Lord Thurlow 
sustained a demurrer to the bill (which of course precluded temporary injunction) and 
the opinion indicates that prior decision at law was regarded as indispensable. The 
earliest reported case granting the temporary injunction seems to be Boulton v. Bull, 
3 Ves. Jr. 140, 30 Eng. iRep. 937 (1796), where infringement of patent was charged; plain-
tiff had brought an action and obtained a judgment subject to the opinion of the court, 
but the court was equally divided. In granting injunction pending another action, Lord 
Loughborough gave some weight to the verdict, but the opinion indicates, upon the 
whole, that the ancillary temporary injunction was well known. Unreported Maryland 
cases of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are cited in a note on 1 Bland 
Ch. 581. Other early cases are Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson, 6 
Ves. Jr. 689, 31 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1802) (copyright); Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. Jr. 215, 32 Eng. 
Rep. 336 (1803) (copyright); Harris v. Thomas, 1 Hen. &: M. (Va.) 17 (1806) (trespass to 
land); Shubrick v. Guerard, 2 Desaus. Eq. (S.C.) 616 (1808) (trespass to land). To the 
last cited case, the learned editor appended a note indicating that in his opinion the 
decision was novel, if not erroneous. 
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law.17 This proceeded, of course, on the idea that the reason for the 
rule lay in the right to jury trial, an idea that is historically ques-
tionable but is plausible enough. This exception to the rule did 
not go unchallenged. In a copyright case Lord Cottenham said, 
. . . "if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction without giving an 
opportunity for trial at law, there would be a different law in this 
Court and in the courts of law upon the subject."18 This argument 
overlooked the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, but 
its more serious fault lay in lack of proportion. Applying, or at-
tempting to apply, the rules of the common law, the chancellor 
could not possibly create a hundredth part of the conflict that re-
sulted from his deliberate departures from the common law in 
cases of trust, mortgage, etc. In either case, the real problem was a 
choice of evils. At least one American court has repudiated the dis-
tinction between fact questions and law questions.19 But after the 
reorganization of our courts, assigning to the same judicial person-
nel both law and equity cases, it becomes absurd for Judge Jones, 
sitting as a chancellor today, to say that he cannot decide this 
question of law until he has decided it in a separate action brought 
before him as a law judge next month or next year. The old talk 
about "trial at law" survives in some cases decided under fused 
procedure, but if one looks more closely it becomes clear that jury 
trial of issues assigned to jury decision is the only real point in 
dispute. 
(2) The next step was to limit the rule to genuine disputes as 
distinguished from those that are merely factitious, as when the de-
fendant claims title in his pleadings but is not prepared to urge the 
claim seriously.20 This distinction seems never to have been ex-
17 Belknap v. Belknap, 2 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 463 (1817) (Chancellor Kent restraining 
public officers from exceeding their authority); Lyon v. McLaughlin, 32 Vt. 423 (1859) 
(rights in a watercourse); Jennings Bros. &: Co. v. Beale, 158 Pa. 283, 27 A. 948 (1893) 
(title to land). Doubtless it would be more accurate to phrase this distinction in terms 
not of "law" and "fact" but in tei::ms of "questions for judge" and "questions for jury," 
the former embracing construction of written instruments. See United States v. Sandloss, 
(D.C. N.J. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 81 (assuming state law governs this question). 
18 Bramwell v. Halcomb, 3 Myl. &: Cr. 737 at 739, 40 Eng. Rep. III0 (1836). 
19 Black v. Delaware&: Raritan Canal Co., 22 N.J. Eq. 130, 427 (1871), a case involving 
questions as to the powers of a corporation. Compare Delaware &: C. Co. v. Breckenridge, 
55 N.J. Eq. 141, 593, 35 A. 756 (1896). 
20 White v. Flannigan, 1 Md. 525 at 544 (1852) (obstruction of easement); Oberheim 
v. Reeside, 116 Md. 265 at 274, 81 A. 590 (1911); Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179, 15 
N.E. 67 (1888) (trespass to land); Mathias v. Holland, 132 Va. 274, Ill S.E. 134 (1922) 
(obstruction of easement). 
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pressly rejected, and presumably it would now be accepted every-
where, because it is intolerable to let a defendant postpone deci-
sion by merely colorable allegations. There is no acid test to de-
termine which disputes are serious and which are not-but this 
merely means that this like other rules of law may be difficult to 
apply to some cases. A more bothersome problem is raised by the 
closely related idea that the requirement of trial at law is applic-
able only to serious disputes in the sense of disputes difficult to 
decide. If it is insisted that evidence must be taken at length to 
determine whether the dispute is too serious for the chancellor, 
double litigation is aggravated. Instead of leaving all questions 
on the merits to a law action, which at least simplifies the equitable 
suit to that extent, we will have a trial on the merits in equity and 
then, if the dispute proves serious, another trial on the merits at 
law. The rule must be administered with this point in mind. De-
fendant must be required merely to introduce "sufficient evidence, 
not to ·overturn the plaintiff's title or to establish his own (for 
these are the very questions hereafter to be tried) but to show that 
he has some plausible and real grounds for bringing the title in 
question."21 And if, on this preliminary showing it is held that the 
clispute is not serious, this decision must be adhered to, no matter 
what develops in the course of the trial. Othenvise, our last state 
will be worse than the first. 
(3) Late in the nineteenth century, a few audacious courts de-
clared that trial of the right rests in discretion.22 But one must not 
count on these cases too heavily. Do they mean any more than 
21 Woodbury, J., in Perry v. Parker, 1 Woodb. & M. 280 at 282, 19 Fed. Cas. 291, 
No. 11,010 (1846), speaking on a motion for temporary injunction. 
22 Colman v. Dixon, 50 N.Y. 572 (1872); Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179, 15 N.E. 
67 (1888); Griffith v. Hilliard, 64 Vt. 643 (1890); Peck v. Ayres & Lord Tie Co., (6th Cir. 
1902) 116 F.·273. 
Vermont, in more recent cases. has ~one as far as any state in rejecting the ancient 
rule. In Barrell v. Renehan, 114 Vt. 23, .39 A. ·(2d) 330 (1944), the Vermont court took it 
for granted that grounds for equitable relief justified trial of disputed title though there 
were genuine fact issues-adverse possession and acquiescence in boundaryline. In Cabot 
v. Hemingway, 115 Vt. 321, 58 A. (2d) 823 (1948), the issue of legal title involved only 
the question how far the boundary _of plaintiff's land extended into Lake Champlain; 
defendant had already started a damage action of trespass against plaintiff, but it was 
held proper LO consolidate that action for trial as part of plaintiff's equity suit, which 
had been started subsequently. 
The Massachusetts court in LaChance v. Rubashe, 301 Mass. 488, 17 N.E. (2d) 685 
(1938), held it to be proper to try an issue of title by adverse possession in equity as 
part of an injunction suit. See also Ercanbrack v. Clark, 79 Utah 233, 8 P. (2d) 1093 (1932). 
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that the court has discretion in cases of dispute that does not ap-
pear serious, and do they cover all issues, including that sacred 
issue of title to land? In any case, the discretion of the trial court 
is presumably reviewable and much depends upon the inclination 
of the appellate court to give the trial court elbow room. But this 
discretionary solution should be cultivated for it offers the easiest 
out for courts whose precedents commit them to the old rule. With 
an appeal to the idea of discretion which broods over the whole 
field of equity, they can give trial courts full control, and if this is 
done, we may see the end of any requirement that legal issues be 
tried at law. 
(4) Long since, the process of extemion from trial of land title 
to other legal issues went into reverse. In cases of patent and copy-
right, one has to go back half a century to find a direction of issues 
of fact, and still farther to find a case in which a genuine action at 
law was held prerequisite. The situation here is particularly clear 
because it is now generally recognized that in this class of cases 
what we need is not a less expert but a more expert tribunal. Per-
haps it is also a material factor that most of the litigation is in 
equity, so that one easily comes to think of patent and copyright as 
pure equity business, forgetting that in theory they involve legal 
rights and legal torts. 
(5) Of course another way to get rid of the old rule is to forget 
it, and this road has been much travelled. As one reads the ad-
vance sheets, he cannot but be impressed by the infrequency with 
which this point of procedure is raised, even when it would be in 
order. But a wide difference may ·be observed between the practices 
of the several states. In some the old rule has considerable vigor; 
in others, it is decrepit; in yet others it seems to be dead. At the 
present time, and we may suppose for the immediate future, the 
crucial issue is the dispute as to title to land, the point at which 
this strange story began. We mean the case where each party 
claims the whole title, so that success of one leaves the other high 
and dry. It cannot be denied that there are modern decisions, 
much too recent to be brushed away as archaic, which assert the 
old idea in some form-"trial at law" or "jury trial."23 Do not in-
23 Hartman v. Pennsylvania Water &: Power Co., 317 Pa. 417, 176 A. 437 (1935): 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Greenwood, (W.D. S.C. 1928) 40 F. (2d) 679; Lake Lenore, Inc. v. 
Delaware, L. &: W. R.R. Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 533, 168 A. 178 (1933); Green v. Cowgill, 30 
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quire why this case should be different. This is to ask for logic 
where there is no logic. If there is a reason to be found it will be 
found in some strange history that we may perhaps outlive. 
Del. Ch. 345, 61 A. (2d) 410 (1948). McRaven v. Culley, 324 Ill. 451, 155 N.E. 282 (1927), 
used both adequacy of legal remedy and failure to establish the legal right as grounds 
for dismissing an action to enjoin trespass. 
